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The Puzzle 
 
Many observers of the Israeli scene have been perplexed by the country’s apparent 
resilience to bad political news. The headlines of late seem uniformly dreadful. 
While the country is still licking its wounds from a botched, if not humiliating, war 
with Hezbollah, the Palestinian territories again slide into turmoil, and the experts 
rumour yet another conflict with Syria. The U.S. entanglement in Iraq and Afghani-
stan is only getting deeper, and many speak of an imminent attack on Iran with un-
told regional consequences. Israeli politicians and public officials – from the presi-
dent, through the prime minister, to the chief of staff, to the justice minister – have 
been embroiled in corruption and other scandals. The courageous capitalist media 
routinely expose government officials as incompetent crooks and the Israeli Parlia-
ment as an irrelevant institution.   
And yet none of these headlines seem to impact the economy. It’s roaring.   
Local commentators have been trying to make sense of this apparent puzzle for 
over a year now. Most point to the effect of liberal globalization. The long fight for 
sound finance, they say, is finally bearing fruit. The government was forced to rein in 
its spending, and the consequent emergence of budget surpluses now helps free 
scarce resources for more productive private use. In parallel, free trade and capital 
decontrols attract global investors, while allowing Israeli capitalists to link up with 
the rest of the world. Laissez faire has arrived in the Holy Land: the country’s political 
folly and its security roller coaster no longer matter for its ‘economy.’1
Foreign analysts offer other explanations. For Thomas Friedman of The New 
York Times, the secret lies in the Israeli genius.2 The imagination, innovation and 
flexibility of the country’s citizens, bolstered by higher education and government 
support for entrepreneurship, help Israel adjust and respond to an ever-changing 
world. Prosperity, according to Friedman, comes from the head.  
Social critic Naomi Klein snubs Friedman.3 Israel’s soaring stock market and 
China-like growth rates, she argues, are fuelled not by the country’s human capital, 
but by its mutating war economy. Military calamities, terrorism and counterterror-
ism offer an ideal environment for developing and testing weapons of oppression. 
                                                          
1 Nechemia Strassler, Buy Me Gaidamak, Hebrew. Ha'aretz, June 13, 2007.  
2 Thomas Friedman, Israel Discovers Oil, The New York Times, June 10, 2007.  
3 Naomi Klein, How War was Turned into a Brand, Guardian, June 16, 2007. 
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Israel has become a big laboratory for such weapons. It develops and tests the hard-
ware and software of violence – against its Arab neighbours and against the Palestin-
ian population – and then sells them to the rest of the world. Economic prosperity 
thrives on political crisis. 
 
The Historical Context  
 
These explications, whether plausible or not, all fall into the same trap: they believe 
the capitalist media. They rush to explain why the Israeli economy is roaring without 
ever stopping to ask whether it is roaring.    
Granted, the latter question is not as exiting as the former. But since everyone 
seems to take the ‘boom’ for granted, we thought it might it be a good idea to check 
the facts. Just to be on the safe side.  
So, is the Israeli economy roaring? 
Clearly, the answer cannot be decided on the basis of last year’s performance or 
the most recent quarter. Israel and the region have been in turmoil for decades, so 
economic performance, too, must be put in historical context. This is what we do in 
Figure 1. 
The chart focuses on GDP per capita, expressed in constant prices and rebased 
to purchasing power parity. This measure is constructed in several steps. First, the 
statisticians estimate, for every year, the country’s gross domestic product, or GDP, 
expressed in prices prevailing in some base year. This estimate – which economists 
call ‘real’ GDP – supposedly represents the aggregate ‘quantity’ of newly produced 
goods and services (in contrast to ‘nominal’ GDP, which represents both the prices 
and quantities of production).  
Next, the statisticians rebase the country’s ‘real’ GDP so it conforms to an inter-
national standard of purchasing power parity (PPP). Since different countries pro-
duce and consume different ‘baskets’ of goods and services, their ‘real’ GDP levels 
are not readily comparable. The purpose of the PPP conversion is to enable such 
comparison. To achieve this conversion, the statisticians make the hypothetical as-
sumption that all countries produce the same international basket. They then impute 
to each country the level of ‘real’ GDP it could achieve if it were to produce not its 
own goods and services, but those included in the international basket.  
Finally, the statisticians divide the country’s ‘real’ GDP in PPP terms by the size 
of its population. The result is GDP per capita in constant prices expressed in pur-
chasing power parity. Economists use this latter measure to assess a country’s aver-
age productivity and average standard of living – both over time and in comparison 
with other countries. 
Before turning to the data, we should note that these conventional measurements 
of ‘productivity’ and the ‘standard of living’ are highly problematic, both conceptu-
ally and empirically. And the same is true for the common emphasis on ‘aggregates’ 
and ‘averages’ – emphasis that serves to ignore and conceal distribution and the un-
- 2 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BICHLER AND NITZAN: Israel’s Roaring Economy 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Israel / U.S.A.
(right)
Israel / China
(left)
Israel / India
(left)
ratio ratio
www.bnarchives.net
 
                                             Figure 1: Relative GDP per Capita 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: GDP per capita is measured in constant 1990 International 
Geary-Khamis dollars that represent purchasing power parity (PPP). 
Data for 2004-5 are measured in constant 2000 $US and spliced with 
prior observations. 
SOURCE: Angus Maddison, World Population, GDP and per Capita 
GDP, 1-2003 AD; World Development Indicators. 
 
 
derlying structure of the political economy. We nonetheless stick here to standard 
practices so that we can question the conventional creed on its own terms. 
Figure 1 compares the per capita performance of Israel with three countries: 
China, India and the United States. We do so by plotting three series, each of which 
expresses the ratio between Israel’s per capita GDP and the per capita GDP of one of 
these three countries.  
The overall picture points to the mid 1970s as a clear watershed. During its so-
called ‘socialist’ period, Israel outperformed. After the 1977 rise of Likud and the 
arrival of ‘liberalism’, Israel lagged. 
The two lower series, plotted against the left-hand scale, track Israel’s perform-
ance relative to China and India. We can see that Israel’s per capita GDP was 
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roughly 6 times China’s in the early 1950s, and that this ratio doubled, to about 12, 
by the mid 1970s.  
From that point onward, though, the process inverted. China's per capita GDP 
soared, Israel’s lingered, and the ratio between them dropped precipitately. In 2005, 
Israel’s per capita GDP was only 3 times bigger than China’s, representing a four-
fold relative decline since the mid 1970s.  
A similar development, albeit less dramatic, is evident from the comparison with 
India. Here, too, Israel outperformed till the mid 1970s, after which the process went 
into reverse. 
Seen from this long term perspective, Israel’s recent ‘boom’ – assuming there is 
one – is a blip on a long term downtrend. Despite its three decades of liberalisation, 
enterprising genius and military testing, Israel hasn’t been able to deliver anything 
close to ‘China-like,’ or even ‘India-like,’ growth rates.   
Of course, one could reasonably contest this comparison. Obviously, it is mis-
leading to contrast Israel – a mature capitalist society – with ‘emerging markets’ such 
as China and India.  
But, then, Israel hasn’t done that well relative to mature capitalist countries ei-
ther. The top series in Figure 1 shows the ratio between Israel’s per capita GDP and 
that of the United States, plotted against the right-hand scale.  
Like with China and India, here too Israel outperformed till the mid 1970s and 
underperformed thereafter. Its per capita GDP fell from a high of 62 per cent of the 
United States’ in 1975, to 57 per cent in 2005.  
 
Where Have All the Capitalists Gone? 
 
So there is nothing very miraculous about the Israeli economy. But, then, this preoc-
cupation with the ‘Israeli economy’ is itself misleading.   
Measures of national growth rates, GDP per capita, unemployment and the like 
may be of great importance for most Israelis. But they are irrelevant for Israeli capi-
talists.  
There are two main reasons for this assertion. First, and more generally, capital-
ists are interested not in the growth of ‘material’ output and the so-called ‘real’ capi-
tal stock, but in the expansion of their financial assets. And as strange as it may 
sound, the ‘real’ world of economic performance and the ‘nominal’ world of finance 
often are unrelated and sometimes even move in opposite directions.4   
Second, and specifically for our purpose here, is the issue of identity. Economic 
measures do not matter for Israeli capitalists simply because there are very few ‘Is-
raeli’ capitalists left.  
                                                          
4 See our recent Hebrew monograph, The Gods Failed, the Priest Lied, May 2007, and the 
more general discussion in our Elementary Particles of the Capitalist Mode of Power, October 
2006. 
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Since the early 1990s, the opening up of Israel, both outward and inward, has 
created a massive flow of capital going in both directions. Global investors, transna-
tional corporations, Russian oligarchs and money launders have all flocked into Is-
rael. They bought up anything of value – bonds and stocks, entire companies and 
prime real estate, sport teams and local politicians. In parallel, domestic capitalists 
have diversified abroad: they took the proceeds of their local divestments and in-
vested them outside Israel.  
The net result of this bidirectional process has been the disappearance not only 
of the ‘Israeli’ capitalist class, but also of ‘Israeli’ companies. 
Nowadays, all the large capitalists who happen to live in Israel (at least part of 
their time) have global investments that often eclipse their holdings in Israel proper. 
And practically all the leading corporations located in Israel are transnational – in 
operations, ownership, or both. 
In other words, the issue is not that Israeli accumulation has become indifferent 
to Israeli politics, but rather that Israeli accumulation has become less and less ‘Is-
raeli.’  
The consequence of this transnationalization of ownership is illustrated in Fig-
ure 2. The chart correlates the annual rates of growth of the Tel Aviv Stock Ex-
change (TASE) and of the NASDAQ (with underlying monthly data denominated in 
$US). Each point in the series represents the correlation over the previous five years, 
with values ranging from a minimum of –1 (indicating that the rates of growth of the 
two stock markets move exactly in opposite directions), through a mid-point of 0 (de-
noting that the two markets are unrelated), to a maximum of +1 (when rates of 
growth move exactly in the same direction).     
The trend depicted in the chart is unambiguous. During the 1980s, the two mar-
kets were more or less independent. The correlation between them was low and often 
negative. But over time, and particularly since the early 1990s, the transnationaliza-
ton of ‘Israeli’ capital and capitalists has made the correlation tighter and tighter.  
When we first plotted this relationship in 2001, the correlation coefficient ap-
proached 0.7. By 2006, it reached 0.92.5 In non-technical language, this latter num-
ber suggests that, over the 2001-2006 period, 92 per cent of the variations in the 
TASE could be ‘explained’ by variations in the NASDAQ (it would be difficult to 
argue the opposite). And, indeed, since the two asset classes share similar owners, 
have similar sources of earnings, and float in similar pools of liquidity, there is really 
no reason why they shouldn’t move together.  
Thus, if the Israeli stock market is currently booming, it is not because of or de-
spite the ‘political situation.’ It booms for the same reason the NASDAQ does. And 
if and when the TASE takes a nose dive, again, don’t look for local or regional ex-
planations. Just check the NASDAQ.  
 
                                                          
5 For the early estimates, see Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, The Global Political 
Economy of Israel, London: Pluto Press, 2002, Figure 6.6, p. 355.  
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                                 Figure 2: Converging Accumulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The TASE (Tel Aviv Stock Exchange) index is based on splicing 
of IMF data (until December 1976), the General Index (January 1977 to 
March 1993) and the Mishtanim Index (April 1993 onward). Both the 
TASE and NASDAQ are expressed in $US. The series displays monthly 
observations. The straight line going through the observations is a linear 
regression. 
SOURCE: IMF and NASDAQ through Global Insight; TASE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of course, Israeli politics continues to matter in many different ways. It matters 
to the companies listed in Tel-Aviv insofar as it guarantees that the stock market can 
open every morning, and that their Israeli operations can function without hin-
drances. Domestic politics also matters insofar as it affects Middle East develop-
ments, and hence global accumulation, the NASDAQ and, therefore. . . the TASE.  
But formal politics matters not because it is public. It matters precisely because it 
is anti public. As long as the country’s patriotic ‘politicians’ and ‘public officials’ re-
main obedient to capital in the name of democracy, and as long as the cost of bribing 
them remains reasonably low, the resulting boom of private accumulation will re-
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main mysteriously ‘delinked’ from the fracturing of public life and the disintegration 
of autonomy and democracy 
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